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Abstract
Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations Þrms may
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1. Introduction
The predictions of oligopoly theory depend crucially on behavioral assumptions on how a
Þrm conjectures about the way the other Þrms react to its own actions. Cournot made the
assumption that Þrms maximize their proÞts, taking as given the quantity of the rival Þrms.
That is, rivals are expected not to react at all to changes of a Þrms own action. Later
contributions by Bowley (1924), Stackelberg (1934), Hicks (1935) and Leontieﬀ (1936) var-
ied this assumption and proposed alternative solutions, initiating the conjectural variations
literature.
Interest in conjectural variations grew with the analysis of the consistency criteria.
Consistency, in addition to the individual rationality assumption underlying the notion of
Nash equilibrium, requires that conjectures about rivals behavior have to be correct. In
Bresnahan (1981), the consistency of conjectures occurs whenever the slopes of Þrms re-
action functions are (locally) equal to the conjectural variations.1 Applying this deÞnition,
Bresnahan (1981) shows, among other things, that a unique solution exists for duopoly with
linear-quadratic costs.
The literature following Bresnahan (1981) pointed out two fundamental problems with
the conjectural variations approach and the consistency criteria in particular: The heart of
the problem is the notion of a conjectural variation. This notion is ad hoc inasmuch as none
of the models using a conjectural variation explains how it is formed or whence it came
(Daughety, 1985, p.246). The second problem is closely related to the Þrst. Conjectures
have been found very diﬃcult to rationalize (Makowski, 1987). Theorists may Þnd consis-
tent conjectures appealing because of the parallel to rational-expectations theory. However,
attempts to derive conjectures merely from rationality assumptions have not been successful.
Conjectures are essentially a-rational (Makowski, 1987).
Recently, some authors addressed these problems by proposing explicitly dynamic
models, usually repeated Cournot settings (Dockener, 1992; Sabourian, 1992; Cabral, 1995).
These authors examine conditions under which the outcome of the repeated games equals
the outcome of the static conjectural-variations model. For example, Cabral (1995) proposes
1This deÞnition can actually be traced back to Leontieﬀ (1936). See also Martin (2002).
1
an inÞnitely repeated game with minimax punishments in which, for each discount factor,
there is a conjectural variation, such that, for any linear oligopoly structure, a Þrms output
in the optimal equilibrium is equal to the quantity of the conjectural variations solution. In
this way, the conjectural variations models are justiÞed as a short cut (Sabourian, 1992,
p.236), mimicking the outcome of more complex dynamic games. However, note that only
the conjectural variations outcome is justiÞed but nothing is said about the origin and nature
of the conjectures themselves.
In this paper, we propose an evolutionary approach to explain conjectures. We do not
impose any rationality or consistency criterion on the conjectures Þrms may hold. However,
given the conjectures, Þrms play the market game rationally. The link between market
performance and conjectures is that proÞts in the duopoly game determine the success in
an evolutionary game. So, what our model does is to impose evolutionary selection of
conjectures followed by rational choice of actions in the basic market game. As a result, we
show that the conjectures surviving the evolutionary process are the consistent conjectures
proposed by Bresnahan (1981). That is, we do not only justify the market outcome implied
by consistent conjectures, we also justify the conjectures themselves.
The evolutionary process we apply has successfully been applied to explain various
economic phenomena. The concept was proposed by Güth and Yaari (1992) who labelled it
indirect evolutionary approach. As in our paper, the idea is that subjects act rationally
in their market transactions but factors inßuencing the market game like preferences or
beliefs are formed in an evolutionary process. This approach has been used to explain e.g.
monopolistic competition (Güth and Huck, 1997), altruism (Bester and Güth, 1998) and
behavior in the ultimatum game (Huck and Oechssler, 1999). Königstein and Müller (2000)
propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 brießy states the main modelling assumptions. In
section 3, we Þrst deÞne the market before deriving the consistent conjectures equilibrium.
In the second part of the section, we determine the evolutionarily stable conjectures. In
section 4 we discuss our Þndings.
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2. Modelling assumptions
We consider two Þrms i = 1, 2 in a heterogeneous-goods market. The strategy sets are
Si = {qi | qi ≥ 0}, i = 1, 2, and the inverse demand functions are given by
pi(qi, qj) = ba− bqi − θqj, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j (2.1)
with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and b ≥ θ. Cost functions have the form
ci(qi) = bcqi + c (qi)2 /2, i = 1, 2 (2.2)
with bc, c ≥ 0. Thus, Þrm is proÞt is given by
πi(qi, qj) = pi(qi, qj)qi − ci(qi) (2.3)
= (ba− bqi − θqj) qi − bcqi − c
2
(qi)
2 (2.4)
= (a− bqi − θqj) qi − c
2
(qi)
2 (2.5)
where a := ba−bc. Note that our assumptions on demand and cost are equal to Assumptions
1 and 2 in Bresnahan (1981), except that we assume that Þrms are symmetric.2 The case of
constant marginal cost is obtained by setting c = 0.
3. Results
3.1. Consistent conjectures equilibrium
We start by reiterating Bresnahans (1981) deÞnition of a consistent conjectures equilibrium
(CCE). Let ρi = ρi(qj), i 6= j, denote Þrm is reaction function. From our assumptions, we
know that a unique and linear CCE exists (Bresnahan, 1981, Theorem 1). We therefore
restrict the attention to linear conjectures such that ri ∈ R, i = 1, 2, denotes Þrm is
conjectures about Þrm js reaction to qi.
2With asymmetric demand and cost functions, the evolutionary analysis below is extremely messy and
cumbersome. Bresnahan (1981) shows that the model may also allow for Þxed costs which, from his As-
sumption 3, should not be too large.
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DeÞnition 1. A consistent conjectures equilibrium is a pair of quantities, (q∗1, q
∗
2), and of
conjectures, (r∗1, r
∗
2), such that
q∗1 = ρ1(q
∗
2), q
∗
2 = ρ2(q
∗
1), (3.1)
and
r∗1 =
∂ρ2(q1)
∂q1
, r∗2 =
∂ρ1(q2)
∂q2
. (3.2)
That is, Þrms quantities have to be a Nash equilibrium (conditions (3.1)), and a Þrms
conjecture about the other Þrms behavior has to be equal to the slope of the other Þrms
reaction function (conditions (3.2)).
We now compute a closed-form solution of the consistent-conjectures equilibrium for
the market deÞned above. From the Þrst-order conditions of proÞt maximization
∂πi(qi, qj)
∂qi
= a− θqj − qi(2b+ θri + c) = 0 (3.3)
we derive Þrm is reaction function
ρi(qj) =
a− θqj
2b+ θri + c
. (3.4)
The slope of Þrm is reaction function is
∂ρi(qj)/∂qj = −
θ
2b+ θri + c
. (3.5)
Thus, the consistent conjectures are the solution of the following system of two simultaneous
equations
ri = − θ
2b+ θrj + c
, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j (3.6)
whose two candidate solutions are given by
r := ri = rj =
−2b− c± A
2θ
(3.7)
with
A :=
q
(2b+ c)2 − 4θ2 > 0. (3.8)
4
The equilibrium quantities, q∗i , are the solution of the system of two simultaneous
equations (3.3). This solution is
q∗i =
a
c+ θr + 2b+ θ
. (3.9)
Note that, using the fact that r1 = r2 = r, the second-order condition for proÞt
maximization is given by
∂2πi(qi, qj)
∂q2i
= −2(b+ θr)− c < 0. (3.10)
The equilibrium quantities, q∗i , evaluated at r = (−2b− c± A) /2θ equal
q∗i =
2a
c+ 2b+ 2θ ± A (3.11)
which are both strictly positive. However, the s.o.c. (3.10) reads −2(b+ θr)− c = ± A(−1).
That is, the s.o.c. is negative for the positive root and positive for the negative root, so, the
positive root yields the maximum.
To summarize the consistent-conjecture equilibrium, the unique conjecture is
r∗ =
−2b− c+A
2θ
(3.12)
implying equilibrium outputs of
q∗i =
2a
2(b+ θ) + c +A
(3.13)
and proÞts of
π∗(r∗, r∗) =
2a2A
(2(b+ θ) + c+A)2
(3.14)
with A as in (3.8).
3.2. Evolutionarily stable conjectures
In this section, instead of imposing a consistency condition as in DeÞnition 1, we will make
conjectures subject to evolutionary selection. We will Þrst derive Þrms outputs given their
conjectures. Since conjectures determine proÞts, they also determine reproductive success
and we can study the evolutionary selection of conjectures in a second step. The underlying
assumption is that if Þrms diﬀer in evolutionary success, the individual characteristics of
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more successful Þrms will spread within the population more quickly than the characteristics
of the less successful ones. This leads to a dynamic process that determines the long-run
distribution of individual characteristics within a society.
Consider the two steps more formally. We will refer to Þrm is (constant) conjecture,
ri ∈ R, as to Þrm is type (higher polynomial conjectures are analytically not tractable).
Firms types may be completely arbitrary and types are known whenever two Þrms compete
against each other. We will derive Þrms behavior given their types. Within strategic games
this implies that the chosen strategy proÞle is a Nash equilibrium, denoted by (q∗i (ri, rj),
q∗j (ri, rj)). In the second step, the types (conjectures) are the strategies and the evolutionary
success function, i.e., Þrms proÞts
π∗i (r1, r2) ≡ πi(q∗1(ri, rj), q∗2(ri, rj)) (3.15)
evaluated at equilibrium strategies, are the payoﬀ functions. To Þnd the types that survive in
the long run, we apply the static concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, ESS (Maynard
Smith, 1982).
DeÞnition 2. An equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures is a pair of quantities,
(q∗1, q
∗
2), and of conjectures, (r
∗
1, r
∗
2), such that
q∗1 = ρ1(q
∗
2), q
∗
2 = ρ2(q
∗
1), (3.16)
and
π∗(r∗i , r
∗
j ) ≥ π∗(r, r∗j ) for all r and i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j (3.17)
and
π∗(r∗i , r) > π
∗(r, r) for all r and i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j with π∗(r∗i , r∗j ) = π∗(r, r∗). (3.18)
That is, an equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures requires a Nash equilibrium
in outputs given the types (3.16), and an evolutionarily stable preference type r∗ which is a
best reply against itself (3.17) and no r-mutant invading a society of r∗-players may be more
successful than r∗ (3.18).
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We now solve for an equilibrium of this kind. Our system of Þrst-order conditions
(3.3) can be solved for equilibrium strategies3
q∗i (ri, rj) =
a (2b+ θ (rj − 1) + c)
4b (b+ c) + θ (2b+ c) (ri + rj) + θ
2 (rirj − 1) + c2
. (3.19)
Substituting q∗i (ri, rj) and q
∗
j (ri, rj) in πi(.) yields the evolutionary success π
∗
i (ri, rj) of type
ri, given that the opponent exhibits type rj:4
π∗i (ri, rj) = πi(q
∗
i (ri, rj), q
∗
j (ri, rj)) (3.20)
=
(q∗i )
2
2
(c+ 2 (b+ θri)). (3.21)
Note that the evolutionary success functions are symmetric (in the sense of π∗1(r1, r2) =
π∗2(r2, r1)) and that the function π
∗
i (ri, rj) determines evolutionary success for all combi-
nations of types. Therefore, we can simplify the notation and refer to π∗(r, l) as type rs
evolutionary success when paired with type l.
In order to satisfy stability requirement (3.17), we have to Þnd an r∗ that is a best
reply against itself. Candidates can be found by considering the Þrst-order condition
∂
∂r
π∗(r, l) = 0 (3.22)
which can be solved for r = −θ/(2b + θl + c). Setting r = l = r∗ and solving the resulting
quadratic equation with respect to r∗ results in two candidates for an ESS:
r∗ =
−2b− c± A
2θ
(3.23)
where A is deÞned as in (3.8). We know already that the negative root violates the second-
order condition for proÞt maximization with respect to output. Therefore, only the candidate
r∗ = (−2b− c+A) /2θ remains.
3We do not need to impose parameter restrictions that guarantee equilibrium quantities to be non-negative
as economically meaningless behavior will be driven out by evolutionary forces (see below).
4Note that the game with types bri, brj does not have an equilibrium if 4b (b+ c) + θ (2b+ c) (bri + brj) +
θ2 (bribrj − 1)+c2 = 0. For such bri, brj we proceed as in Possajennikov (2000) by extending the Þtness function
by continuity in the Þrst argument in the sense of π∗i (bri, brj) = limri→bri limrj→brj π∗i (ri, rj). This limit does
always exist on the extended real line R∪{±∞} and, as a result, the function π∗i (ri, rj) is diﬀerentiable with
respect to the Þrst argument at rj = ri.
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To prove that r∗ is the unique best preference parameter against itself, consider
r (r∗, r∗)−r (r, r∗) = 4a
2θ2f(r)¡
A2 − 2θ2 + θr (2b+ c) + (2b+ θr + c)A¢2 (2(b+ θ) + c+A)2 (3.24)
where f(r) = a2r2 + a1r + a0 with
a2 = 8b(b
2 − θ2) + c ¡4(3b2 − θ2) + c(c+ 6b)¢+A ¡c2 + 4bc+ 4b2 − 2θ2¢ (3.25)
a1 = −8θ3 + 8θb2 + 8bcθ + 2θc2 +A (4θb+ 2θc) (3.26)
a0 = 2θ
2A. (3.27)
It is clear that the sign of (3.24) is determined by the sign of the function f(r) = a2r2 +
a1r + a0. Note that a2 > 0 for Þxed b, c and θ. Thus, f(r) is a U-shaped parabola for each
Þxed set of b, c and θ. Solving ∂f(r)/∂r = 0 for r, shows that the minimum of the function
f(r) occurs at r = −a1/2a2. Now, note that f(−a1/2a2) = 0 and that −a1/2a2 = r∗. That
is, the function f and thus the expression r (r∗, r∗) − r (r, r∗) in (3.24) is 0 if and only if
r = r∗ and otherwise it is positive. This implies that r∗ is the unique evolutionarily stable
type (conjecture).
Proposition 1. The unique evolutionarily stable conjectures of the market game deÞned
above are given by r∗ = (−2b− c+A)/2θ and are equal to the consistent conjectures.
Since the evolutionarily stable conjecture is equal to the consistent conjecture, also outputs
and proÞts are as in (3.13) and (3.14) above.
4. Discussion
In this paper we propose an evolutionary process to select among conjectural variations.
We Þrst determine the unique equilibrium in quantities for all possible combinations of
linear conjectures. For the evolutionary game with conjectures as mutants and reproductive
success (a Þrms proÞt) as the payoﬀ functions, we study conjectures which are evolutionarily
stable. It turns out that the equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures is the same
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as Bresnahans (1981) consistent-conjectures equilibrium. In this way, we justify both the
outcome implied by consistent conjectures and the conjectures themselves.
Evolution favors Þrm types with better relative performance. In our model, a neg-
ative conjecture serves as a commitment device in the sense that it yields a relative proÞt
improvement compared to a type with a larger conjecture. Therefore, evolution selects gener-
ally negative conjectures. With homogenous goods and constant marginal cost, for example,
it yields the so-called Bertrand conjectures (r∗ = −1). However, the result that the evolu-
tionarily stable conjectures coincide with the consistent conjectures is surprising as there is
no obvious analogy of the two concepts.
Our result may be positively interpreted as it provides support of consistent conjec-
tures. The other side of the medal, the negative interpretation of our result, is that no other
conjecture can be justiÞed by arguments based on evolutionary selection. Many empirical
researchers use the notion of conjectural variation as a useful shortcut to capture the degree
of competitiveness which is not reßected in the number of Þrms, the extent of product
diﬀerentiation, cost asymmetries, etc. The conjecture is supposed to capture something that
can be thought of as conduct in the industry but that is hard to model explicitly (see, e.g.,
Kim and Vale, 2001). Our result indicates that conjectural variations can not be used to
reßect any degree of competitiveness as only one speciÞc conjecture is evolutionarily stable.
This indicates that more research on the theoretical foundations of conjectural variations is
needed.
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